

OrdnanceReports

News updates from around the world



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In Review: The Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE) deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

by Sgt. 1st Class Dale H. Crewe, Senior IFTE Repair Supervisor, Echo Company, 703rd Main Support Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division Camp Maintain

True validation of any weapon or support system can only happen in wartime. For the Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE) and its operations (Military Occupational Specialty 35Y) wartime validation finally happened as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom thanks to Echo Company, 703rd Main Support Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Ga.



The Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) system was originally fielded in 1991. Although it has been successfully operational on a few peacekeeping missions and during 12 years of peacetime operations, one vital question remained. Can ATE be deployed in a combat environment and remain operationally prepared to support the battle?

We had the honor of finally answering this question. Our unit received our orders on Jan. 6, 2003, to deploy to Kuwait in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. We would take part in the liberation of the Iraqi people after years of tyranny.

We had four days to prepare for deployment, a task that our section completed without delay.

We actually deployed on Jan. 19 and soon arrived at Camp New York, our new home in the vast Kuwaiti desert. Our vehicles and equipment arrived by boat on Feb. 12 and we were operational the following day. We remained fully mission capable while supporting the Division's Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) from MLRS, Avenger, and Paladin systems in anticipation of the upcoming conflict. We quickly received enough jobs to activate two 12-hour shifts in order to accommodate the support requirements.

After much anticipation, we breached the Iraqi border on Mar. 21, two days after the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

We were concerned about the effect the journey would have on the test equipment given the operational tempo and climatic conditions. The myth of ATE immobility was quickly vanquished as we convoyed

more than 400 miles through hostile territory and numerous sandstorms in the Iraqi desert in just over six days.

The 703rd Main Support Battalion moved forward further and faster than had been thought possible. While the battle for Karbala and the push towards Baghdad continued, our section set up operations in an abandoned Iraqi factory complex just 26 miles south of Baghdad, appropriately named "Camp Maintain". We were again fully mission-capable found we had many waiting customers.

Throughout mission support in Kuwait and combat operations in Iraq, our most daunting task was accomplishing repairs with few, if any, repair parts. Approved, controlled substitution became paramount to our success.

The soldiers were exposed to a myriad of new technical and environmental challenges that rarely, if ever, arose in training exercises. The constant intrusion of sand into our ATEs and every LRU chassis was a major challenge.

Our emphasis on preventive maintenance rather than reactive maintenance paid off in full. Basic maintenance management principles such as housekeeping tasks; proper use and care of equipment; initial, in-progress, and final inspections; and adherence to test/repair procedures with competent supervision were and always will be the key ingredients to providing effective support to our customer units.

Our philosophy was and remains that every system is only as reliable as the soldiers maintaining it, and is only as effective as the desire and pride the soldiers have in proving it's worth.

Our section learned that there is no greater satisfaction than truly experiencing the combat power of our Division and the honor of being part of the mission, while proving the ATE's capabilities on the battlefield.

The IFTE Section personnel consisted of Staff Sgt. Barbara Allen, Spc Matthew Newell, Pfc Shannon Pitre, Pfc Danny Quirk, Pfc Lee Alejandre, and myself.

Iraqis killed UK soldiers over searches -residents

By Michael Georgy

MAJJAR, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqis said on Wednesday that anger over weapons searches in private homes triggered the killing of six British soldiers and the wounding of eight others in clashes around this southern Shi'ite town this week.

But a British military spokesman in Iraq, Lieutenant-Colonel Ronnie McCourt, said the killing of the six military police in Majjar on Tuesday was unprovoked, adding: "It was murder."

Witnesses and residents said four Iraqis were killed and 14 wounded in the clashes in Majjar, 18 miles south of the city of Amarah.

The British soldiers, training local police, were killed inside a police station, McCourt said near Amarah, 210 miles southeast of Baghdad. He gave no other details.

In the second incident, seven troops were wounded when a helicopter was fired on as it went to aid a military convoy under attack. A British soldier in the convoy was wounded.

British forces denied they had issued a 48-hour ultimatum to local Iraqis to hand over the killers of the soldiers.

"I can categorically deny that ultimatum was ever set," Captain Gemma Hardy, a press officer for British forces in Iraq, told Reuters. "That has not been issued."

In London, Prime Minister Tony Blair said troops may have run into trouble as they tried to disarm local Iraqis.

"There is a background to do with the attempts by British forces to make sure the local population...were disarmed of those weapons," Blair told parliament.

But Blair said it was too early to say what happened in Majjar, in what appeared to be the worst casualties suffered by British forces in a single "hostile fire" incident since the war to oust Saddam Hussein erupted on March 20.

Residents and witnesses said Tuesday's clashes followed days of resentment over efforts to disarm Iraqis, and the shooting erupted after the British forces fired plastic bullets to try to control thousands of protesters.

The witnesses said the Iraqis, believing the British were firing live bullets, fired AK-47 assault rifles, killing the soldiers.

"I yelled at them because they pointed their rifles at a child. I told them 'don't do that' but a soldier hit me with the butt of his rifle in the face," one resident, who refused to give his name, said. "Then the shooting started."

Residents and witnesses said anger had been simmering as the British used sniffer dogs and aggressively searched local homes.

"These British soldiers came with their dogs and pointed weapons at women and children. As Muslims, we can't accept dogs at our homes," Rabee al-Malki told Reuters.

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Helicopters and boats patrol the Tigris River on Monday. U.S. forces continue security measures to thwart guerrilla-style attacks perpetrated against patrols and convoys. AP photo by Ali Haider.

Progress made in Iraq, but deaths hammer home danger

by Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 24, 2003 – Coalition personnel are making progress in Iraq, but the recent deaths of American and British soldiers show the world is still engaged in a dangerous war against terrorism, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said during a Pentagon briefing today.

Four U.S. soldiers have been killed during the last eight days, and news reports indicate today that six British soldiers were killed while patrolling an area northwest of Basra. “Every day ... throughout the world, brave men and women risk their lives to defend us all from terror,” Rumsfeld said. “They will certainly be called upon to do so for the foreseeable future.”

The secretary listed indications of coalition progress. He said they have captured 32 of the 55 regime “most wanted” and have killed two others. He also noted that coalition officials are working to rebuild an Iraqi army that does not terrorize its own people and will help provide the needed security in the country.

Myers said the coalition forces are putting pressure on opposition in Iraq. “We continue to be aggressive in rooting out pockets of resistance made up of paramilitary forces and Baath Party personnel,” Myers said.

“In recent weeks, we have achieved considerable success in such operations as Desert Scorpion and Peninsula Strike. These operations consist of a series of coordinated raids designed to counter the efforts of those who still oppose Iraq becoming a free nation.”

Myers said that while the United States has brought home 130,000 troops from the region, there are 146,000 U.S. personnel in Iraq.

“They are making progress against the ‘dead-enders’ who are harassing coalition forces,” Rumsfeld said. “Just as they were unable to stop the coalition advance to Baghdad, the death squads will not stop our commitment to create security and stability in post-war Iraq.”

Rumsfeld said the search for Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction continues. He stated that it is still early, and he related anecdotal evidence from the past about the difficulty of locating anything in Iraq.

He mentioned how U.N. inspectors had searched for nine months and had found no evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program. They were ready to announce that fact, and were persuaded not to, Rumsfeld said. Three months later, a defector came forward and provided them proof that Iraq did indeed have a nuclear weapons program, the secretary said.

Coalition forces have been on the ground just eight weeks, Rumsfeld noted, and he has no doubt that the coalition will find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. He pointed out that before the war no one – not intelligence services, not the Congress, not the United Nations, not



Seen through a night-vision device, a soldier from Company C, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), conducts a cordon-and-search mission June 23 at an inn in Mosul, Iraq. The unit was searching for weapons and suspicious individuals. U.S. Army photo by Pvt. Daniel Meacham

even countries that opposed action in Iraq – doubted that Saddam Hussein had a weapons program.

“If Saddam Hussein in fact disarmed, then why didn’t he take the final opportunity the U.N. afforded him, to prove that his programs were ended and his weapons destroyed? Why did he give up tens of billions of dollars of oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed?” Rumsfeld asked.

“If he had in fact disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperation with the U.N. Yet he continued to lie and obstruct the U.N. inspectors.”

Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs chairman Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers also spoke about last week’s action against regime targets that may have spilled into Syria.

On June 18, U.S. special operations forces attacked former regime leadership targets. Myers and Rumsfeld said the intelligence leading to the attack came from information gleaned from senior regime officials in coalition custody. Myers said that Task Force 20 struck two elements: one on a highway, one in a compound. He said coalition officials continue to gather information about the attack.

Rumsfeld and Myers promised more information as it becomes available.

**Full Transcript of Briefing by
Secretary of Defense and
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
appears on pages 4-10.**

DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers - June 24, 2003

Rumsfeld: Good afternoon. Regrettably, four American soldiers were killed during the past eight days in Iraq, three in grenade attacks, and another who was shot on guard duty at a propane distribution center: Specialist O.J. Smith, Specialist Paul Nakamura, Pfc. Michael Deuel and Private Robert Frantz. I also want to express sorrow that the British forces have sustained some losses in the past 24 hours. Certainly, our thoughts and prayers are with their families and the families of all those coalition forces who have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.



Their deaths are a sober reminder that while major combat in Iraq and Afghanistan is over, our country and coalition forces remain engaged in a difficult and dangerous war: the global war on terror. That war will not be over anytime soon. Every day in Iraq and Afghanistan, throughout the world, brave men and women risk their lives to defend us all from terror. They will certainly be called upon to do so for the foreseeable future.

While terrorist regimes have been removed in Baghdad and Kabul, many who wish our people harm remain at large in those countries and elsewhere across the globe. We're putting pressure on them each day. Yesterday, for example, the president designated Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who was sent to the U.S. as an al Qaeda operator, as an enemy combatant and transferred him to the control of the Department of Defense.

In Iraq, difficult work remains. Coalition forces have captured now some 32 out of 55 of the most wanted, and an additional two were killed. And they continue to pursue those that remain at large. They're making progress against the dead-enders who are harassing coalition forces. Just as they were unable to stop the coalition advance in Baghdad, the death squads will not stop our commitment to create stability and security in postwar Iraq.

To help ensure long-term stability and security, we are beginning the process of forming a new Iraqi army. You may have seen the announcement that Walt Slocombe made within the last 48 hours in Baghdad on that subject.

The search for Iraq's WMD continues. We're still early in the process, and the task before us is sizable and complex, but we do know this: before the war, there was no debate about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction programs. Virtually everyone agreed they did: in Congress, in successive Democratic and Republican administrations, in the intelligence communities here in the United States, and also in foreign countries and at the U.N., even among those countries that did not favor military action in Iraq.

If Saddam Hussein had, in fact, disarmed, then why didn't he take the final opportunity the U.N. afforded him to prove that his programs

were ended and his weapons had been destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues, under U.N. sanctions, when he could have very simply had those sanctions lifted, simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed? Why did he file a fraudulent declaration with the United Nations? Why didn't he cooperate with the international community, just as Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa did? If he had in fact disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperation with the U.N., yet he continued to lie and to obstruct the U.N. inspectors.

It's now less than eight weeks since the end of major combat in Iraq, and I believe that patience will prove to be a virtue.

General Myers.

Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I also wish to extend my sincere condolences to the families of the Marines and soldiers who have lost their lives the past several weeks in Iraq, and also to the families of those U.K. personnel, families and friends, who were killed and wounded just recently in southern Iraq. As the secretary said, these losses are a reminder that Iraq remains a dangerous place, but we must continue to stand firm. Our forces' role in establishing and maintaining security is critical to the stability and security of Iraq, and also to our war on terrorism.

While we have brought home some 130,000 — I'm sorry — yes, 130,000 troops from the region, currently 146,000 U.S. forces remain in Iraq. And we continue to be aggressive in rooting out pockets of resistance made up of paramilitary forces and Ba'ath Party personnel. In recent weeks, we have achieved considerable success with operations such as Desert Scorpion and Peninsula Strike. These operations consist of a series of coordinated raids designed to counter the efforts of those who still oppose Iraq becoming a free nation.

Last week, as some of you have already reported, one of our task forces, Task Force 20, conducted a raid near the Syrian border. This raid was based on intelligence gained from the recent capture of leaders of the toppled regime. We struck two elements of a convoy, one on a highway and one in a compound. We are continuing to gather information from the strike, so we don't have any additional details at the moment.

In Afghanistan, coalition forces initiated Operation United — Unified Resolve, consisting of offensive operations in eastern Afghanistan. Coalition forces are been coordinating with the Afghan central government and local authorities to block designated crossing points

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and routes of egress along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Our intent is to deny sanctuary to anti-coalition forces in two eastern provinces and to disrupt cross-border activity.

And finally, we have some news involving a rescue at sea. Early this morning 27 crew members of the Green Glory, a sinking Egyptian flag cargo vessel, were rescued approximately 350 miles off the coast of Oman by the U.S. and British navies. The U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet directed the United States Naval Ship Concord, a U.S. supply ship, and a P-3 maritime reconnaissance patrol aircraft to provide additional assistance in the rescue effort. An MH-60 utility helicopter from the Concord deployed two rescuers, who boarded the Green Glory, assisted in "abandon ship" efforts and helped deploy their lifeboats. Within an hour, the helicopter began to pluck sailors from the Green Glory's lifeboats and take them aboard the British royal fleet auxiliary, the Sir Tristram, where they were medically evaluated, fed and clothed.

And with that, we'll take your questions.

Rumsfeld: Charlie?

Q: Mr. Secretary, General Myers spoke of aggressive operations to put down opposition in Iraq, and he spoke of the raid last week upon the convoy. Has the United States authorized U.S. forces to move into Syria in hot pursuit of suspected former officials? And did in fact that happen last week in that raid?

Rumsfeld: As — two things. As General Myers indicated, we don't have any really final or conclusive information, beyond what Dick gave you, to impart at this moment as to where that border is. And as you know, we don't discuss rules of engagement.

Q: Well, Iraq hasn't — I mean, Syria hasn't even protested, and a defense official told us yesterday that there's been no official exchange with the Syrian government over this. You —

Rumsfeld: I don't know that that defense official's correct. It would be shocking to everybody, I'm sure, if a defense official were not correct. (Laughter.) But in this instance, I cannot verify that. I know there have been exchanges, and I don't know what your definition of "official" is. But —

Q: But you can't say whether or not — or won't say whether or not the United States has authorized, in a hot-pursuit situation —

Rumsfeld: I've responded.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you give us some explanation of how the Syrians became involved in this operation? Did they shoot upon the U.S. forces?



Rumsfeld: The details that Dick gave, I think, are about what we'd like to give at this moment. You know, quote, "defense officials," unquote, have the freedom of not being quoted and of not being — needing to be right. There's no penalty for being wrong. (Laughter.) We do have to be right, and therefore, we need to allow some time so that people can sort through what took place and then get back to us, and then when we talk about it, we like to talk about it in a way that you can feel that we have done our due diligence and we know precisely what took place. Borders are, you know, not

always distinct in life, and I just would rather wait and give you the straight story.

Q: What about the current circumstance, though? I mean, there are some Syrians being held. Can you say how many and why they're being held?

Rumsfeld: There were a very small number of Syrians, and "being held" I don't know is quite the right word. There were several that needed some medical assistance. They were provided medical assistance, and a process to see that that's worked out is under way.

Q: Mr. Secretary, why is this raid, this convoy strike, different than others? This is now six —

Rumsfeld: We didn't say it was.

Q: Well, it's six days later. Usually you have information to provide us soon after events occur in Iraq. Why is it taking so long?

Rumsfeld: First of all, I guess it's — I first heard about it late Wednesday, early evening. So that's not six days ago.

Q: So it's five.

Rumsfeld: Five and a half. (Laughter.) I got to keep him sharp.

Q: He'll be right by tomorrow. (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: Second, it was in a remote area and a considerable distance from Baghdad. And third, people were busy doing a variety of things that involved seeing that people did not escape from the convoy, seeing that the proper people were retained and the people

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that did not need to be retained were released, and attempting to get the right types of equipment to see what took place; and they were busy doing that.

Myers: They're still busy.

Rumsfeld: And they're still busy doing that, and they may be busy doing that for another day or two.

Q: How will the identification work as far as who was killed in this strike? Do you believe that senior Iraqi leaders were in fact taken out?

Rumsfeld: I have no reason to believe that. And I know what Defense officials said for a few days, and what they've now seemingly stopped saying. But I can't say that, so I don't.

Yes?

Q: Who do you think might have been taken out in that convoy? If it wasn't senior leaders — and I assume you're talking about Saddam Hussein —

Rumsfeld: Don't know. We're trying to find out.

Q: But I assume —

Rumsfeld: Don't assume.

Q: — you had some idea who you were targeting?

Rumsfeld: Pardon me?

Q: I assume you had some idea who you were trying to target?

Rumsfeld: Sure. It was night, in fact, late at night, early morning. And there were reasons, good reasons to believe that the vehicles that were violating the curfew that existed in that area were doing it for reasons other than normal commerce. And they were close to the Syrian border. And there were perfectly logical rules of engagement that dealt with that situation.

Q: Did some escape in the convoy?

Rumsfeld: See, now you get into a level of detail — how would one know that? It was pitch black —

Q: But I assume you were following the convoy in some manner.

Rumsfeld: And the answer is that it's — I don't know the answer to the question, and I suspect it may never — we may never know the answer to that question, expect through — possibly through interrogations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said —

Rumsfeld: General Myers is ready for a question.



Q: Oh, General Myers, then. General Myers, you've said that U.S. troops are having considerable success inside Iraq. Yet in the past 24 hours, there were 25 separate attacks against U.S. forces, six Brits were killed in two separate attacks down near Basra, and there was a rocket attack on the civilian mayor's office at Fallujah. That doesn't sound like success. Do you — can you tell us what the U.S. military thinks is happening? Is there an increase in the tempo of attacks? Are they better coordinated today, those conducting the attacks? Or is there a change in their strategy?

Myers: First of all, as we look at this, we look at trends, of course. And — but you've got to be careful of the snapshots you take. And there has been a lot of action lately, a lot of it instigated, as I was talking about in my remarks — a lot of it instigated by coalition forces.

I think the basic analysis, notwithstanding what happened in the last 24 hours or 48 hours, is that the security situation is a little uneven in the country in the north and the south, relatively secure in the Sunni area, central-west and northwest of Baghdad, where you have the biggest issues. I think it's undetermined at this point how coordinated these efforts are. We know that there are Ba'ath Party members that don't want this country to go to a democratic form of government that they don't want. They prefer to return to the old ways. And so, they are still out there. There are other paramilitaries, probably, that have joined them. How organized is yet to be determined, and that's one of the things, of course, we've got intel — intelligence looking at.

Q: We were told last week it was not organized by General Ordnierno of the 4th Infantry Division. Now, you're saying it's uncertain?

Myers: I'd say at this point, it's uncertain. That's right. I mean, things — you can expect things to change on the ground over there, and they may be changing. But I can't — it's hard to say one way or the other at this point.

Rumsfeld: The other reason you may be able to find a seam between what the general said and what Dick Myers said is because he may be referring to a certain area.

Q: Well, his area's the size of West Virginia.

Rumsfeld: I understand. That does not naysay what I just said to you. People may — you may see things that appear to be coordinated

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in a particular area that are not coordinated throughout the entire country, which is a country the size of California.

Q: But you referred to the dead-enders —

Rumsfeld: Yes?



Q: There's a report out of London that the Iranian government has turned over some al Qaeda suspects to unidentified friendly governments in the Middle East. Do you have any indication that Iran has, in fact, turned over some al Qaeda? Or are there still al Qaeda in Iran?

Rumsfeld: I'm sure there's still al Qaeda in Iran, with respect to the last part of your

question. As to the first part, I don't — no. I have not seen anything recently that suggests that.

Q: General Myers —

Rumsfeld: I've seen speculation about that, but I have not seen any hard evidence that that's actually happened.

Q: General Myers, you mentioned the institution of the Iraqi army, beginning putting soldiers in there. What if any decisions have been made about the ethnic composition of that army? Building on the experiences in Afghanistan, as you know — I've bothered you about this before — trying to achieve the ethnic balance and retention in the Afghanistan army is proving elusive. What methods are you guys — you all considering for the Iraqi army in this regard?

Myers: Yeah, I'd have to check on the Afghan army. I know initially when we started out, the — one of the goals in Afghanistan, of course, was to have an ethnic mix that sort of represented the country and that that was tough to come by early on. I don't know that that's true right now. And so I'd — we'd have to go back and check that, and we can get you that information.

But in Iraq, that is certainly the goal, and achievable, we think. And we've got some really good folks that are grappling with that right now. But that — that is our goal.

Q: Well, would it be just the three groups, the Kurds, the Shi'ites and the Sunnis, or would you attempt to get, you know, the smaller groups involved as well?

Myers: I think you have to have a representative — representation from across the country. And that's sort of the standard the

secretary's talked about before in terms of what kind of government do you want. Well, you want one that represents all the people of Iraq no matter how small the minority that has to be represented.

Q: General Myers, speaking of —

Rumsfeld: There — the vetting that's taking place thus far has been focused on individuals who have not been war criminals, individuals who have not been senior in the Ba'ath Party, and more that type of a vetting. But I agree completely with Dick's answer.

Q: You would caution me, then, not to jump to any conclusions that, perhaps, if the first wave happened to be from one specific group, it's because the vetting has cleared them first, perhaps, and it's not reflective of how the eventual make-up of the army will be?

Rumsfeld: I think that question would be — better be addressed to Walt Slocombe, and we can do that and see if we can get an answer for you.

Q: Thank you.

Rumsfeld: He's the one that's been working that through.

Yes.

Q: Still, five and a half days later, the U.S. is continuing to hold five Syrian nationals, only three of whom were wounded. Do you have — I'm still not clear why you haven't returned these people to their country. Do you have any reason, for example, to believe they are anything other than Syrian border guards? And you mentioned this mission was conducted by a military organization, you said, known as Task Force 20. Can you tell us what is Task Force 20, who makes it up, and what their mission is in Iraq?

Myers: No. I don't want to go into any more operational detail on Task Force 20. That's — that's the kind of details that we're just not going to go into. But —

Q: You cannot tell us what — after you named it, you can't tell us what that U.S. military organization —

Myers: It's a U.S. military organization. And we have several task forces —

Rumsfeld: It's a good one.

Myers: It's a good one. (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: You want some elaboration? It's a good one.

Q: Can you please tell us why you have not returned five Syrian nationals to their country? Why have they not been returned? Do you believe they are not border guards, perhaps?

Rumsfeld: Well, let me put it this way. As I indicated, several were

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injured.

Q: Three out of five were injured and needed medical treatment.

Rumsfeld: That's my recollection. And the process by which that will take place is something that's being discussed in other channels. And it will happen. And I don't know that anyone needs a reason why it hasn't happened in five minutes or two days or five days. It will undoubtedly be worked through by the appropriate people in the United States government and the Syrian government.

Q: Have the Syrians asked you for them back?

Rumsfeld: I'm not going to get into what the Syrians have done and what they haven't done.

Q: General Myers, back to this raid just for a moment. How confident are you that the intelligence that resulted in targeting this convoy after the fact, has turned out to be good intelligence and that you didn't just end up targeting some curfew violators or some other sort of petty smugglers, as opposed to a legitimate target? How confident are you?

Myers: I'm confident we had very good intelligence.

Q: And, Secretary Rumsfeld, can I just ask you — follow-up on your statement about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. You said that — in your opening statement, that there was no doubt before the war that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction “programs,” was the word you used.

Rumsfeld: Yes.

Q: I'm just wondering, when I hear you say “programs,” are you signaling at all that Iraq may not have had actual weapons or weaponized forms of this, but simply the programs to produce them? Or am I reading too much into what you said?

Rumsfeld: You may be reading too much. I don't know anybody that I can think of who has contended that the Iraqis had nuclear weapons.

Q: I didn't say nuclear —

Rumsfeld: I'm saying that. I'm trying to respond to your question.

I don't know anybody in any government or any intelligence agency who suggested that the Iraqis had nuclear weapons. That's fact number one.

If you go back to my statement, we also know that the Iraqis did have chemical weapons. They confessed to having had all of these weapons over a sustained period of time. I brought something along. In the '90s, Iraq admitted having 8,500 liters of anthrax and several tons of VX. Iraq admitted producing 6,500 chemical bombs containing an estimated 1,000 tons of chemical agents, none of which have ever been accounted for. In 1998, President Clinton said Saddam Hussein

possessed 5,000 gallons of botulin, 2,000 gallons of anthrax, and 177 Scud warheads, and bombs filled with biological agents.

We know he used chemical weapons against the Kurds and against the Iranians in the war. So you had a country that had these weapons and programs, a country that used those weapons, a country that by everyone who had reason to be knowledgeable believed filed a fraudulent declaration to the United Nations. And it seems to me that that speaks for itself, that they —

Q: But isn't it possible, now in retrospect, that Saddam Hussein could have destroyed the weapons — that is, destroyed the evidence — while maintaining the programs to produce them in the future, in an effort to ride out the sanctions, and that as a result, you may never find any actual weapons in Iraq?

Rumsfeld: I'm not going to get into the various possibilities. They're fairly self-evident as to what the possibilities might be. I have reason, every reason, to believe that the intelligence that we were operating off was correct and that we will, in fact, find weapons or evidence of weapons programs that are conclusive. But that's just a matter of time.

Q: General Myers, can I follow up on that point, though? At this point, what intelligence is there to show that U.S. troops faced an imminent chemical or biological tactical threat in Iraq? From the podium, you and the secretary, for months, warned Iraq generals and colonels not to use the stuff or face war crimes. Can we get that off the table, that U.S. troops apparently did not face the imminent chemical/biological tactical threat that you and the secretary were concerned about?

Myers: No, I don't think you can take that off the table. The intelligence that we reviewed indicated that just the opposite was the fact. And that's why our forces, as they moved north, wore their chemical protective gear, and when missiles were fired, short-range missiles were fired by the Iraqis towards our forces, why they put on

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their masks and took all the appropriate precautions. It was exactly because we thought that that was a very high probability. And that has — I mean, that's what the — that's what we were — anticipated. That's the action we took.

Q: Why didn't —

Rumsfeld: It should also be said that as the forces moved north from Kuwait into Iraq — I've forgotten exactly what city it was in — they found stockpiles of Iraqi protective gear that one doesn't go out and purchase for the dickens of it.

Q: Yeah, but where are the shells and the rockets that would have been fired, you know, for the grace of God hadn't been, but where are they? Speed works both ways. You overcome them, but you should have found something by now if it was such an imminent threat.

Myers: Well, it goes back to the whole issue of — for the last 10, 12 years in Iraq, and the practice of denial and deception. It's the same reason that the first U.N. inspection regime didn't find everything, and why there was a second regime. They're masters of this.

And the other part of that is that, you know, you act off intelligence. Intelligence doesn't necessarily mean something is true. It's just — it's intelligence. You know, it's your best estimate of the situation. It doesn't mean it's a fact. I mean, that's not what intelligence is. It's not — they're — and so you make judgments.

Does that mean we're not going to find shells with residue in them and so forth? No, it doesn't mean that.

Q: (Inaudible.)

Rumsfeld: Let me just go back and take an anecdote. And I don't have the precise months in my head, and I could be wrong by 10, 20, 30 percent. But illustratively, it's correct.

The allegation was made — well, first of all, if you go back, the allegation was made that the Iraqis had a nuclear weapon program. And you probably know the year as — better than I. The inspectors concluded that they did not, they could not find anything, and they were about ready to say that they could not, and they were alerted that they probably ought not to do that. They didn't do that. They'd been looking for months. Nine months is my recollection. They deferred saying what they had concluded — namely, that there was no nuclear weapon program. They deferred, and three months later a defector came in, and they found hard evidence that in fact Saddam Hussein did have nuclear weapon program, unambiguously.

Now we're talking about less than eight weeks, and you keep pressing and saying, "Well, my goodness, by now wouldn't you this, wouldn't you that?" The fact is, they were there nine months and — plus or minus 30 percent, and did not find it, found it only after they had decided it did not exist, and only after defectors came to them and said, "Here is what it is, here is where it is, and here is how you find it." And that is when they realized that in fact they'd

almost made a terrible mistake, after nine months of very hard work.

Q: But on —

Rumsfeld: I just offer that anecdotally.

Q: The shells are somewhere, don't you think —

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: Both you and Paul Bremer have now said that you'd like to see, if I'm quoting you correctly, the Iraqi state-owned enterprises privatized. I'm just wondering, at what point does the Provisional Authority begin to impinge on issues — policy issues that really should be the sovereign right of another state to make? I mean, many countries in the world today have state-owned enterprises within democracies.

Rumsfeld: Sure. A fair — sure.

Q: How can the United States make that decision?

Rumsfeld: It can't. What we said is what we'd prefer. And that's true. If you look down from Mars on Earth, you'll find that the countries that tend to be Stalinist and government-controlled, all aspects of the economy, tend to do a lousy job for their people. Their people are at the bottom of the economic spectrum in terms of GDP per capita. You look at the ones that have freer economic systems and freer political systems, and they do better for their people.

Now, you're quite right. In the last analysis, the Iraqi people will decide what their constitution says, the Iraqi people will elect their government and they will make those judgments, ultimately.

Q: So, with the oil companies, for example, or other companies, you will not take any steps as the Provisional Authority to privatize any state-owned enterprises?

Rumsfeld: I didn't say that. I said, ultimately, the Iraqi people will decide what kind of a political system they want and what kind of an economic system. But that's the answer to your question.

Now, in the meantime, the Coalition Provisional Authority is the authority in the country. And they're going to make the judgments they think are appropriate in very intensive consultation with Iraqi people. And each month that goes by, the consultations will be more intensive and broader and deeper. And as we then move from a — into an interim authority of some kind, and then with the authority over certain of the ministries going to Iraqis and then, ultimately, to a constitution, and then, ultimately, to some sort of a permanent Iraqi government, at that point, they can — will have free play to do whatever they wish with their country.

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DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers - June 24, 2003 continued

So your comment — your question's a good one, but —

Yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said in the past that you will not find chemical or biological weapons unless you have the help of the Iraqi people. Are you getting that help right now? Are you getting information out of the 55 most wanted list members that you have captured?

Rumsfeld: Yes.

Q: You are?

Myers: And from Iraqi citizens, as well. I mean, there are lots — there's lots of ways to report. So, we're getting help from lots of different folks.

Q: General Myers —

Q: As it stands now —

Rumsfeld: We'll make this the next-to-the-last question.

Q: As it stands now, the American people do not know whether their soldiers have encroached into the territory of a nation not directly involved in the Iraq war. Will there be a formal report on this? And will you tell us at some point what happened? And if so, can you tell us when we'll know?

Rumsfeld: Sure. When the dust settles, we may very well — I don't know about a formal report. But when the dust settles, we'll know more about what's been said, and the "senior defense officials" will have drifted away with their inaccuracies, and everyone will know

that which is available to be known.

Q: But you'll tell us.

Rumsfeld: Isn't it a wonderful world?

Yes. Last question.

Q: In the convoy attack, how many people were killed? You talked about the wounded, but we assume people were killed, but how many?

Rumsfeld: We're sorting through that.

Myers: Yeah, they still have to sort through that yet. That's part of the reason we're — we've got to get all the facts, and we don't have them at this point. They're still — still working —

Q: (Off mike) — or AC-130?

Rumsfeld: There were multiple — multiple weapons were used.

Q: Could you update us on the search for Captain Speicher?

Rumsfeld: Briefly. I read two reports today, and what they told me is that the senior people involved in, I guess the Iraqi survey group are focused on this issue, attentive to it, addressing it directly when human intelligence offers suggestions as to how it might be — leads might be addressed directly, that questions are being posed as appropriate in interrogations, and that the interagency teams that are working on these subjects of prisoners of war, senior officials, high value targets, weapons of mass destruction are focused and attentive to it, and that there is nothing that has been turned up thus far that I could elaborate on that would be appropriate.

Thank you very much, folks.

Q: So are you saying that no new light has been shed on it, or you just can't discuss that?

Rumsfeld: I think I like my answer.

Q: So you're not saying whether or not there's any new light shed on —

(Cross talk, laughter.)

Rumsfeld: You know, in life, if you go down one avenue and it's a dead end, some people would say that's a failure, some would say, "No light was shed." I would say you've learned something: you've learned that's a dead end. And in this business, that's what you have to do. You have to go down a whole series of avenues. And you don't know which one's going to be something other than a dead end. So I would not answer it the way you have posed it.

Q: So they're dead ends so far? (Laughter, no response.)



Iraqis gather near the burnt British army vehicle Wednesday June 25, 2003, a day after attackers killed six British soldiers in Amarah, 280 kilometers (174 miles) south of Baghdad. The incident, which wounded eight other soldiers, was the deadliest confrontation for coalition forces since the fall of Saddam Hussein. (AP Photo/Nabil Al-Jurani)

Recruiting effort begins for Iraqi army

by Sandra Jontz, Stars and Stripes

BAGHDAD, Iraq — U.S. military leaders opened recruitment doors Monday for a new Iraqi army, which is expected to grow to about 12,000 infantry soldiers by the end of the year.

Administration officials also announced Monday that career soldiers and officers could begin collecting a monthly stipend in July. The news quelled a morning rally that some said had the makings of another violent demonstration.



Walter Slocombe, the Coalition Provisional Authority's senior adviser for security and defense, points to a reporter Monday during a news conference in Baghdad, where he announced the formation of the New Iraqi Army. Photo by Michael Abrams, Stars and Stripes.

Last week, violence erupted outside the gates of the main U.S. military and government headquarters. After protesters pelted U.S. soldiers with rocks, a military police soldier fired into the crowd, killing two protesters. Those demonstrating were former Iraqi soldiers who had gathered to protest the lack of pay and the U.S. administration's disbanding of Iraqi army.

The monthly stipend — between \$50 and \$150 a month depending on rank

and years of service — is slightly less than what the soldiers earned under Saddam Hussein's rule. But it is enough to afford the former soldiers to "lead modest and decent lifestyles," said Walter Slocombe, senior adviser for Security and Defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Slocombe was Defense Department Undersecretary of Policy for eight years during the Clinton administration.

Soldiers of the former regular army and rank-and-file Republican Guard soldiers will be eligible to collect the monthly stipend, Slocombe said.

As a basic rule, former military officers in the top senior ranks will not be eligible for high-ranking positions in the new army. Payments also will not go to the members of the old regime's internal security forces or those accused of war crimes or human rights abuses.

Slocombe said the provisional authority expects to pay stipends to 200,000 to 250,000 career soldiers who lost their jobs after the U.S. military and coalition forces toppled Saddam's regime in April.

Roughly 300,000 conscript soldiers will be eligible for a one-time payment, although Slocombe did not provide an amount.

Slocombe said the new army will serve and defend the nation.

Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who until last week was commanding general of the Army's Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga., will lead training schools for the New Iraqi Army, or NIA as it is being called.

He will have a staff assigned to him, but for the most part, the United States plans to contract out the training services instead of employing U.S. soldiers for the job, Slocombe said.

Although the army "will be a military force and not a police force, not a security force," the infantry soldiers' main duties will be to protect and defend Iraq's borders, key installations, facilities and routes, Slocombe said.

The new army also will be considerably smaller than the 400,000-plus army under Saddam.

"The country was grotesquely over militarized," Slocombe said. "It is the fact that most people in the old Army will not be able to continue their military careers."

By the end of two years, the authority envisions 40,000 soldiers divided into three divisions.

For now, there are no plans to stand up an Iraqi air force, Slocombe said.

The authority also plans to pay stipends to retired and disabled veterans from Kurdish paramilitary organizations, who fought for years to overthrow Saddam's regime.



WASHRACK — U.S. Army Sgt. Terry Henderson, M2A2 Bradley gunner for 3rd Infantry Division, 115th Infantry Battalion, Company B, known as the Audie Murphy unit, cleans a Bradley at the vehicle wash racks, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Petersi Liu

Defend America News

Global War
On Terrorism

A map showing the Middle East and surrounding regions, with labels for Afghanistan, Iraq, Djibouti, and the Philippines.

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Iraqis killed UK soldiers over searches -residents continued

Muslims take offence over dogs in their homes, believing the animals to be impure.

Other residents criticized methods of the British occupiers, and alleged incidents involving soldiers during the searches.

“A British soldier held the underwear of a woman and stretched it. How can we accept this as Muslims and as Shi’ites,” resident Faleh Saleem said.

McCourt, saying British forces were now on heightened alert in the region, acknowledged the Majjar deaths had changed the situation: “The emotion here is deep, deep disappointment among the soldiers. It has changed.

The top U.S. administrator in Iraq said on Wednesday saboteurs linked to Saddam had cut off power lines to Baghdad, depriving the war-weary Iraqi capital of electricity.


Much of Baghdad has gone without power or water in recent days, adding to the hardship of people coping with severe unemployment and a lack of public safety.

“The problem is due to sabotage of the main power line between Beiji and Baghdad,” Paul Bremer, leader of the provisional authority in Iraq, told a news conference.

“Almost certainly the saboteurs are rogue Baathist elements. They are trying to hinder the coalition efforts to make life better for the average Iraqi person,” he said, referring to Saddam’s Baath Party.



British soldiers wearing helmets and flak vests return to their camp near Majar al-Kabir, 290 kms south-east of Baghdad, Iraq, Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The soldiers have started wearing the protective gear after 6 British military police were killed in Majar al-Kabir on Tuesday. (AP Photo/Saurabh Das)



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Abizaid: U.S. displaying ‘offensive spirit’ in Iraq

by Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 25, 2003 – “The best protection that we can give our soldiers is an offensive spirit in a tough place,” said Army Lt. Gen. John Abizaid today during his Senate confirmation hearing to be the next commander of U.S. Central Command.

Abizaid, who is currently CENTCOM’s deputy commander, said that coalition forces need to seek out the enemy and bring the fight to them.

“They will be able to do that as long as we don’t hunker down in base camps and try to avoid contact,” he said before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “We need to seek out contact. We need to be aggressive, and that’s what we’re doing in Iraq.” He said that, contrary to press reports, American soldiers and Marines are being aggressive. He said in more than half the instances, the U.S. forces are the ones who initiate the actions.

President Bush nominated Abizaid for the post June 18. If confirmed by the Senate, he will replace Army Gen. Tommy Franks who will retire Aug. 1. Abizaid is of Lebanese extraction and speaks fluent Arabic. Michigan Sen. Carl Levin said if confirmed, the general would be heading to the most difficult command in the U.S. military. Levin observed that the job entails skills “as a warfighter, strategist and diplomat.”

The senators asked Abizaid if the American military is prepared for the challenges of post-war Iraq. “The answer is ‘yes,’” Abizaid said. “We’ve been serving in places like Kosovo and Bosnia for a long time.” He was referring to soldiers, in particular, who have much experience in those areas’ peacekeeping operations.

When asked about combat vs. peacekeeping operations, the general noted that troops would prefer to be involved in the more clearly defined area of direct combat – stability operations contain more variables.

He told the senators that for the “foreseeable” future, the number of American troops in Iraq will stay at about 145,000. This will change as circumstances change, he said. The number will go up if operational considerations mandate it, it will go down as the coalition makes progress in rebuilding the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army.

Abizaid stressed that opposition to the coalition comes from three areas. The first is directly from the leftovers of Saddam Hussein. He said there is residual Baathist activity in the stronghold made up of the triangle of Ar Ramadi, Baghdad and Tikrit.

“That’s a very tough area. We believe that there are a number of Baathist cells that continue to operate there,” he said. “The level of organization doesn’t seem high to me.”

He said nothing the leftover Baathists could do would threaten to defeat the coalition militarily. “The best way to deal with the Baathist resurgence and activity there is to take the battle to them, be offensive, dismantle the cells, kill those who would try to kill us and

be very aggressive,” he said.

The second level of activity comes from outsiders to Iraq. He said there are radical anti-American Islamists who are taking advantage of the power vacuum in certain parts of the country to strike at Americans. These groups are not allied with the Baath Party.

Again, Abizaid noted, the coalition must deal with these groups aggressively. He said coalition forces struck a camp last week with excellent results. The enemy fighters they engaged had come from all over the Middle East, he said. To end the threat, the coalition also must pay attention to Iraq’s border with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The third level of unrest comes from a criminal element. “There’s no doubt there’s an increase in criminal activity, and many are well-armed,” he said. “Dealing with the criminal element becomes a tougher one for us. That’s one that won’t be solved by all the soldiers in the United States Army. That’ll be solved by building police capacity within Iraq and time and training and effort to reform Iraqi police institutions.”

The senators grilled Abizaid on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. He told them that he has had no reason to change his belief that coalition forces will find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

“I believe that as we get on with the mission to look for weapons of mass destruction and piece together the evidence that is available within the country – not only by looking at documents, but by talking to various people who have come forward – that we will piece together the story of what happened to the weapons of mass destruction somewhere between 1998 and 2003,” he said.

He said he is sure the evidence will show Iraqi deceptions and he is “confident that it will lead us to actual weapons of mass destruction.”

Abizaid said the intelligence effort in Iraq was mixed. “My overall assessment of how intelligence served us throughout the campaign was that it was the most accurate I’ve ever seen on the tactical level, probably the best I’ve ever seen on the operational level and perplexingly incomplete on the strategic level in regards to weapons of mass destruction,” he said.

The general said U.S. forces have never had such a complete picture of enemy tactical dispositions and intentions. He said the speed of the coalition campaign was due largely to that intelligence picture.

“Operationally we came up with a remarkable clear picture. We expected to fight the main battle between the line of Karbala, Kut and Baghdad, we expected it to be fought against the four Iraqi Republican Guard divisions and we expected their exact positions on the battlefield,” he said.

On the strategic side there were some successes. He pointed to the

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Pentagon's first enlisted staff ride visits Antietam

by SPC Bill Putnam

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, June 24, 2003) — Forty-seven Pentagon soldiers learned how coffee, communications, firepower and timing can win or potentially lose battles when they conducted a staff ride of the Antietam battlefield June 20.

Although officers normally conduct staff rides, the rainy and gray day was a good learning experience for non-commissioned officers for what a staff ride is: learning how a battle was fought by walking on the battlefield itself, said Sgt. Maj. Frederick Johnstone, the sergeant major for the Army's G-3 (operations).

"It was also good to understand what it was like to be a soldier in the Civil War," Johnstone said.

The trip was originally planned for the week of Sept. 11, 2001, but obviously had to be postponed, he said. Antietam was chosen for its importance in the country's history, said Johnstone.

Two historians from the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Ted Ballard and Bill Epley, that led the staff ride, talked about that importance.

More historians are starting to think that Antietam, and not Gettysburg, was the real turning point of the war. Although Gettysburg blunted the Confederate's last offensive power, the strategic implications of Antietam are far greater, said Ballard and Epley.

The greatest loss to the Confederates probably wasn't the men or supplies they lost during the battle, it was the loss of recognition by Britain and France, Ballard said.

A successful campaign in the North might have given them that much needed support, Ballard said.


Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation freeing slaves in the South because Lee's army was driven south, Ballard said. Not to mention that the battle was the bloodiest day in American history with nearly 24,000 soldiers killed, wounded or missing in a nine-hour span, said Ballard.

The two historians also highlighted the two different leadership styles that marked the first and only battle Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee and Union Maj. Gen. George McClellan fought against each other, said Ted Ballard.

Even though Lee was hurt after falling off his horse, his leadership style was up front and personal and he spent most of the day on the battle line, said Ballard.

McClellan, on the other hand, was very removed literally and figuratively from the battle. He spent most of the day on a farm a few miles from the battle, drinking brandy, smoking cigars and talking with the press, said Ballard.

At The Cornfield, a place where 9,000 soldiers were killed or wounded,



Bill Epley, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, explains the Confederate's main motivation of for fighting during the Civil War during the staff ride's stop at The Sunken Road June 20. Photo by SPC Bill Putnam.

and which both sides traded "too many times to count," Ballard said, the lack of communication between McClellan and his commander was highlighted.

"Imagine an outdoor concert there. That's the amount of people that died," Ballard said.

The attack on the 30 acres of full-grown corn was an illustration of McClellan's battle plan or lack of one, said Ballard.

His plan, said Ballard, was to "throw a corps here and another corps there," and hope to out maneuver Lee.

"This entire battle was actually a small series of engagements," he said.

The first engagement was in the northern edge of the battle, around 7 a.m. when the Union I and XII Corps attacked Lee's left flank through The Cornfield; the second major engagement took place around 9:30 a.m. at the Sunken Road; and the day's third engagement was at the South Bridge, now known as Burnside Bridge, around noon.

Throughout his two times as commander of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan's command philosophy was to out-maneuver his enemy and not kill them, said Ballard.

"He was trying to win points," he said. "He would be happy to cause Lee to withdraw."

But instead of minimal casualties through maneuver, the piecemeal engagement actually caused more casualties, he said.

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Pentagon's first enlisted staff ride visits Antietam continued

The number of 23,110 dead, wounded or missing from that day, and the lack of command during the battle marks that, Ballard said.

Epley explained some things that many of the soldiers went through and why they fought.

"Massed firepower" was the way battles were fought back then, he said.

For example, the fact that three corps - one Confederate and two Union - fought over The Cornfield was normal, he said. Men standing shoulder-to-shoulder with muzzle-loading rifles were the only way to engage an enemy. That wouldn't happen today because that

firepower is distilled down to a platoon of infantry armed with machine guns and assault rifles.

Epley said the South's primary motivation for fighting so hard under such dire circumstances was a state's right to do as it pleased.

At the Sunken Road where Union Brig. Gen. William French's division attacked against Confederate Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill's division and slugged it out for almost four hours and took 5,000 casualties.

Communicating with another corps or army headquarters was fairly easy back then, said Ballard.



Historian Ted Ballard, with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, explains the finer points of massed firepower with muzzle-loader muskets to soldiers during the staff ride June 20. Photo by SPC Bill Putnam.

Towers were set up behind the battle line, with men who waved a code with flags, he said.

So when two Union corps commanders were wounded early in the battle, McClellan knew about it right away via the towers. But true to his command philosophy, he did nothing about it except send another corps or another officer in that direction to take charge, Ballard said.

The Union officer corps was actually afraid to take the initiative because of a fear of taking too many casualties, Epley said. Another officer was taken into custody for taking too many casualties early

in the war. He said that caused most officers to second-guess themselves, even if it meant winning a particular action.

Case in point would be The Sunken Road. Once the Union made it past the road, the soldiers stopped, stacked arms and started to boil coffee even though they had blown a huge hole through the Confederate's lines, said Ballard.

It was a pattern repeated throughout the day, he said.

At Burnside Bridge, Ballard explained the tactical situation facing Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps.

On the Union's right flank with 11,000 men, he faced one regiment of about 600 Georgia soldiers commanded by Confederate Brig. Gen. Robert Tombs, who coincidentally lost the Confederate presidency by one vote, Ballard said.

"So his consolation prize was to be a general," he said.

The original bridge, built in the 1840s is still standing, is narrow, just wide enough for four five men to march across, Ballard said. Tombs' men were on a steep hill on the opposite bank and had a clear view to shoot down at the constricted columns of men. After repeated assaults against the dug-in Confederates, Burnside's men still couldn't take the bridge.

Then a promise of whiskey carried the day for the Union. A teetotaler commanded the 51st Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment and he promised the men a whiskey ration if they took the bridge and the height beyond, said Ballard.

The heights were theirs after the next charge.

Burnside then advanced his men forward to Lee's right flank and was on the verge of cutting off his route of retreat when Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill finally reached the battlefield after a 17-mile march from Harpers Ferry, the Union arsenal on the Potomac.

Hill's division hit Burnside's left flank and stopped the advance and saved the Confederate army from destruction, said Ballard.



A view of the field the Union army marched across to reach the Confederate's position at The Sunken Road on Sept. 17, 1862. About 5,000 soldiers from both sides were wounded or killed here over a four-hour period.

Photo by SPC Bill Putnam.



U.S. and South Korea war veterans, showing faces, salute during the ceremony to mark the 53rd anniversary of start of the Korean War, at the Peace Square of the Korean War Museum in Seoul, Wednesday, June 25, 2003. President Roh Moo-hyun marked the 53rd anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War on Wednesday by urging North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions in return for international aid.(AP Photo/Katsumi Kasahara)

French special forces soldier looks at a Mirage fighter jet flying overhead, Tuesday, June 24, 2003 as they patrol the outskirts of Bunia, Congo. Fighters from the tribal faction that controlled this troubled northeastern Congolese town appeared to have completely pulled out Tuesday as a deadline set by a French-led international force expired.(AP Photo/Karel Prinsloo)



A British soldier guards a hospital in Basra, 600 kilometers, 372 miles south of Baghdad, Iraq Tuesday June 24, 2003. Attackers fired on British forces in neighboring Amarah, killing six soldiers and wounding eight others in the deadliest confrontation for coalition forces since the fall of Saddam Hussein.(AP Photo/Nabil Al-Jurani)

Abizaid: U.S. displaying 'offensive spirit' in Iraq continued

coalition capture of 32 of the top 55 most-wanted as one example. But, he said, he is perplexed that the coalition hasn't found weapons of mass destruction. "As we overran positions early in the campaign, we found an incredible amount of defensively oriented chemical equipment," he said. "I surmised from that that they were ... going to use chemical weapons."

He said there was a lot of intelligence saying that there was a "red line" in Iraq, beyond which Iraqi forces would use chemical weapons.

"In 1991, I served in northern Iraq," he said. "I had seen up in the Kurdish areas the fact the Iraqis had used chemical weapons against their own people. I certainly knew from studying the campaigns ... during the eight-year war with the Iranians that (the Iraqis) had used chemical weapons and a lot of the intelligence traffic indicated on a tactical level, as well as a strategic level, that they would use it against us."

Still, as coalition units continue their investigations, he believes that the Iraqi WMD programs will come to light.

The committee will vote on Abizaid's confirmation today, with the full Senate likely to vote on his confirmation, shortly, said Senate staffers.

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